

## Message Text

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MASERU FOR SCHAUFLE

E.O. 11652: XGDS 1, 2

TAGS: OTRA (SCHAUFLE, WILLIAM E.) PFOR

SUBJECT:SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS: SITREP NO. 49,  
DECEMBER 2, 1976

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE FROM SEELYE AND SAUNDERS.

FOLLOWING IS AN ABRIDGED VERSION OF SITREP NO. 49.

1. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT GAVE RICHARD ITS PROPOSALS ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT ON NOVEMBER 30. THE TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE IT APPROACH EMPLOYED AND THE INSISTENCE ON RE-STRUCTURING THE FIVE POINTS PACKAGE PROVIDE FURTHER INDICATIONS THAT THERE IS ROUGH SAILING AHEAD. EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT IS THE EVIDENCE, FROM WISNER'S RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH CHONA, OF AN EMERGENCE OF A PATRIOTIC FRONT-FRONT-LINE STATES' POSITION. CHONA MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE ENVISAGES A DRASTIC RESTRUCTURING OF THE FIVE POINTS FRAMEWORK. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HINTED THAT SMITH MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE A DEAL TO PRESERVE THE WHITES' POSITION (THOUGH NOT HIS OWN) IF HE WERE WILLING TO  
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NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE CHONA PROPOSALS. WHAT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING, HOWEVER, IS THAT CHONA'S IDEAS SEEM TO PREFIGURE A PATRIOTIC FRONT-FRONT-LINE SETTLEMENT PACKAGE AND TO REFLECT A COMPROMISE THAT MAKES THE

FRONT THE CHOSEN INSTRUMENT OF THE FIVE PRESIDENTS. WE DOUBT THAT SMITH REGARDS HIMSELF AS SUFFICIENTLY BEATEN AT THIS POINT TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS THAT CHONA IS PROPOSING.

2. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S POSITION ON THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. NKOMO AND MUGABE PRESENTED RICHARD, WITH TWO DOCUMENTS ON NOVEMBER 30, ONE ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ONE ON A GENEVA TIMETABLE. IN ESSENCE THEY STRUCK A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT POSE, SAYING THAT IF THE BRITISH WOULD AGREE TO THE BASIC STRUCTURE, THEY WOULD AGREE TO DISCUSS DETAILS. IN THEIR SKELETAL OUTLINE, THEY PROPOSED THAT:

--THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS BE THE REAL BASIS OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, WITH A CLEAR MAJORITY OF MEMBERS DRAWN FROM THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, ONE OF WHOM WILL BE THE PRIME MINISTER;

--THE COUNCIL HAVE FULL LEGISLATIVE AS WELL AS EXECUTIVE POWERS;

--DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL BE BY SIMPLE MAJORITY, SAVE ON MATTERS WHERE THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION REQUIRES A TWO-THIRDS OR OTHER SPECIAL MAJORITY;

--THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT MINISTERS CONTROL ALL THE MINISTRIES DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE PROCESSES.

ON THE BRITISH ROLE, THE FRONT PROPOSED A RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WHO WOULD BE CHARGED WITH ENSURING FULL AND PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT.

3. ACCORDING TO THE FRONT'S AGENDA, THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE BRITISH ROLE WOULD BE DISCUSSED  
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DECEMBER 1-4, FOLLOWED BY A DISCUSSION OF THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT, DECEMBER 6-8, AND ITS FUNCTIONS, DECEMBER 9-19. ON DECEMBER 20, THE CONFERENCE WOULD FIX THE EXACT INDEPENDENCE DATE AND APPOINT THE MINISTERS.

4. MUGABE AND NKOMO ARE HARDLY SHOWING THEIR WHOLE HAND, AS CHONA'S CONVERSATIONS WITH WISNER INDICATE (SEE BELOW), BY OMITTING DETAILS, THEY MAY HOPE TO SMOKE OUT THE BRITISH INTENTIONS. NONETHELESS, WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT THESE PROPOSALS REFLECT THE AFRICANS' BASIC APPROACH TO A SETTLEMENT.

5. WISNER'S CONCLUSIONS ON THE NOVEMBER 30 EXCHANGES.

ON THE BASIS OF THE BRITISH CONSULTATIONS ON NOVEMBER 30 WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT (AND ALSO WITH OTHER NATIONALIST DELEGATIONS), WISNER BELIEVED THAT:

--IF THE BRITISH HAD TO DEAL WITH ONLY MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE, THEY COULD MAKE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT THAT THE RHODESIANS COULD ACCEPT;

--NKOMO, IF ISOLATED FROM MUGABE, MIGHT GO ALONG;

WISNER BELIEVES THAT THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS AT GENEVA MAY BE MORE WITH THE FRONT-LINE PRESIDENTS, WHO HAVE "A GREATER INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND MAINTAINING THEIR OWN UNITY...THAN...REACHING A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT...."

6. THE ROADBLOCKS THAT MUGABE'S PEOPLE ERECTED THIS TIME INCLUDED:

--REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BILATERALLY WITH THE BRITISH;

--A RIGID TIMETABLE AND WORK PROGRAM FOR THE CONFERENCE;

--INSISTENCE THAT THE BRITISH ACCEPT THE BASIC GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE THEY WERE PROPOSING.

7. CHONA'S VIEWS ON A SETTLEMENT. WISNER'S RECENT  
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CONVERSATIONS WITH CHONA THROW CONSIDERABLE LIGHT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT'S PROPOSALS. AMONG OTHER POINTS THAT EMERGE FROM THESE CONVERSATIONS, THEY:

--CONFIRM OTHER INDICATIONS (E.G., REINHARDT'S CONVERSATIONS ON THE WEEKEND WITH KAUNDA AND NYERERE) THAT THE FRONT-LINE STATES HAVE SHIFTED THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS BY DEVELOPING A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT.

--SUGGEST THAT THE FRONT AND THE FRONT-LINE STATES ARE PROBING FOR A DEAL WITH SMITH ON THEIR TERMS.

--INDICATE THAT THE FRONT-LINE STATES AND THE FRONT

HAVE FIRMED UP AN ALLIANCE THAT MEETS THE MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS OF ALL THE PARTIES; IN PARTICULAR, IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE FRONT IS THE CHOSEN INSTRUMENT FOR THE FIVE PRESIDENTS.

8. ON THE DETAILS OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, CHONA TOLD WISNER THAT ALL BUT ONE OF THE FIVE POINTS

WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING FULFILLED, E.G., THE FIRST HAD BEEN MET BY THE AGREEMENT ON THE INDEPENDENCE DATE, THE FIFTH WOULD BE MET BY THE EXPECTED ACTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD CALL FOR AN END TO SANCTIONS AND GUERRILLA WARFARE.

9. THE ONE POINT THAT REMAINED IN DISPUTE WAS THE THIRD POINT--THE COUNCIL OF STATE, WHICH WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO ZIPA. ON THIS, CHONA SAID THAT:

--THE BRITISH NOW AGREED THAT THIS WAS A "COSMETIC" IDEA AND ARE LOOKING FOR ALTERNATIVES.

--HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY "SMITH'S MAN" IN GENEVA THAT THE RHODESIANS WOULD NOT HOLD THE LINE ON THIS ISSUE.

--THE POTENTIAL BRITISH ROLE WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR A WHITE RHODESIAN BLOCKING FORCE DURING THE TRANSITION (CHONA SAID HIS UNNAMED RHODESIAN CONTACT AGREED).

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IF, IN ADDITION, THE BRITISH TOOK RESPONSIBILITY FOR RHODESIA'S ARMED FORCES AND POLICE, THE LAST DISPUTED ELEMENT COULD BE MANAGED.

10. IN RESPONSE TO WISNER'S DISCUSSION OF CHECKS AND BALANCES AS THE ESSENCE OF THE THIRD POINT, CHONA ARGUED THAT THEY WOULD BE IMPLICIT IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT:

--THE RHODESIANS WOULD HAVE 5 PORTFOLIOS (OUT OF 25), TO BE ALLOCATED BY THE BRITISH.

--THE PERMANENT UNDERSECRETARIES OF ALL MINISTRIES WOULD BE WHITE, AS WOULD ALL THE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE.

--THE ARMY AND THE POLICE WOULD BE RETAINED THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD, AND ALL WHITE OFFICERS WHO TOOK THE OATH TO THE QUEEN WOULD BE RETAINED. (CHONA SAID THAT NKOMO AND MUGABE AGREE.) DEFENSE AND SECURITY WOULD, OF COURSE, BE SUPERVISED BY A BRITISH RESIDENT COMMISSIONER.

--THE ECONOMY WOULD BE IN EUROPEAN HANDS.

--THE BRITISH PRESENCE WOULD FURTHER REASSURE THE WHITES.

„ IN ADVANCING A PLETHORA OF ARGUMENTS WHY THE TWO-TIER SYSTEM WOULD NOT WORK, CHONA EVEN NOTED THAT SOME FRONT ELEMENTS WERE URGING THAT PRE-INDEPENDENCE

ELECTIONS BE ABANDONED AND THE INTERIM STRUCTURE OUTLINED ABOVE KEPT IN PLACE AFTER INDEPENDENCE, THUS GIVING THE WHITES MORE PARTICIPATION IN A POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT THAN THEY WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE.

12. WISNER COMMENTS THAT CHONA SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTING THAT SMITH MIGHT BE ABLE TO STRIKE A LONG-TERM BARGAIN FOR THE WHITE COMMUNITY IF HE WERE WILLING TO DEAL ON THE FRONT TERMS AND MAY WANT US TO PASS THIS HINT ON TO THE RHODESIANS.

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13. SUMMING UP HIS CONCLUSIONS, WISNER OBSERVES:

--CHONA MADE NO EFFORT TO CONCEAL THE FACT THAT HIS PLAN WOULD INVOLVE COMPLETE REDEFINITION OF THE GENEVA FRAME-WORK AS IT INVOLVES THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT.

--CHONA'S VIEWS ARE TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, SINCE THEY REFLECT THE CAREFUL PREPARATION OF A POSITION ON THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, THE FRONT-LINE STATES, AND THE NIGERIANS (PRESENT IN THE FORM OF THE COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER).

--WHAT WE ARE NOW SEEING IS A COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENT WHICH SEEMS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FRONT AND THE FRONT-LINE STATES. THE UNITY OF THE FRONT MEANS THAT NYERERE, MACHEL, AND KAUNDA WOULD ALL HAVE THEIR PREFERRED PARTNERS IN POWER.

14. THERE IS NOT MUCH THAT WE CAN ADD TO WISNER'S ANALYSIS AT THIS POINT. WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE NOW COMING UP TO A MILESTONE AT GENEVA. FOR THE PAST TWO WEEKS WE HAVE BEEN SEEING INDICATIONS THAT THE FRONT-LINE STATES WERE WORKING UP A POSITION ON THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. THE BLUEPRINT LAID DOWN BY CHONA MAY NOT BE THE FINAL FORM (THE OMISSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE ZIPA FORCES STRIKES US AS ODD, FOR EXAMPLE), BUT NONETHELESS WE THINK THAT WISNER IS CORRECT IN JUDGING THAT THIS IS THE PRECURSOR OF A UNIFIED POSITION. ONE RESERVATION THAT WE HAVE IS THAT THE GUARANTEES TO THE WHITES SEEM TOO ELABORATE FROM THE AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW, AND WE SUSPECT THAT CHONA MAY HAVE BEEN EXAGGERATING THEM FOR PURPOSES OF SALESMANSHIP.

15. THE EMERGENCE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE CHOSEN INSTRUMENT OF THE FRONT-LINE STATES AND THE FORGING OF UNITY WOULD ALSO GO FAR TO EXPLAIN WHAT WE SAW DURING THE INDEPENDENCE-DATE PHASE OF THE TALKS. IN EFFECT, THE FRONT-LINE STATES USED THIS ISSUE TO ENFORCE UNITY ON THE FRONT AND TO HAMMER OUT THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES.

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16. THE BROADER QUESTION, OF COURSE, IS WHETHER SMITH (AND VORSTER) WILL ACCEPT A REDEFINITION OF THE SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK. WE CLEARLY DO NOT KNOW AT THIS POINT WHETHER SMITH IS PREPARED TO DEAL ON THE TERMS CHONA SKETCHED. WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT HE DOES NOT REGARD HIMSELF AS BEATEN AND THAT HE WILL BALK. ROBINSON

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